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Britain, the world, and Europe1 
Oliver Daddow 
 
 Great Britain has lost an Empire and not yet found a role’ – Dean Acheson, 1962  
Quoted in Brinkley 1990: 599 
 
Learning objectives 
 To understand the nature and extent of Britain’s key international relationships. 
 To appreciate the ideas that have shaped British foreign policy. 
 To explain the dynamics behind the Coalition government’s ‘Liberal Conservative’ foreign 
policy. 
Introduction 
Britain is a major global political, diplomatic and economic actor by virtue of its imperial 
history, its membership of key international organisations, forward-leaning defence 
posture and the City of London’s position as a leading financial centre. With such a vast 
web of connections have come real and lasting debates about the most appropriate 
role for Britain in the world, especially since decolonisation after the Second World War 
and the turn to Europe as a forum in which Britain tries to exert global inﬂuence through 
its foreign policy. Some suggest Britain should safeguard its national interest by 
working more closely with its partners in the European Union. Others argue that Britain 
should continue to think and act globally, particularly by cultivating the ‘special 
relationship’ with the United States. In reality very few British leaders have wanted to 
make a decision in favour of one over the other, performing a difficult foreign policy 
                                                     
1 Thanks to Jeremy McIlwaine at the Bodleian Library Oxford for helping me access Churchill’s 1948 
Party Conference speech. 
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balancing act as a result. Although their language may change, it is clear that the 
leaders of all the main political parties continue to see Britain as a ‘force for good’ in the 
world by virtue of working the country’s Commonwealth, US and EU connections. 
However, with the age of austerity prompting severe budget cuts across all 
departments of government a question remains. Can Britain any longer afford a 
globally engaged foreign policy when it does not have the means to back its good 
intentions with financial muscle?  
Britain’s global outlook 
Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s scathing assessment of the state of British 
foreign policy in 1962 continues to rankle with British politicians of all the major parties. 
Membership of many of the world’s leading regional and international organisations gives 
Britain a profile and inﬂuence that very few other states can match. However, the image of a 
former great power only slowly and reluctantly coming to terms with its fall from grace has 
come to characterise assessments of Britain’s place in the world by observers from within and 
outside the country. In no small measure the criticisms act as a useful reality check to 
politicians from across the board who have continually claimed ‘great’ global status for 
Britain in the face of many facts to the contrary, not least the country’s decreasing ability to 
finance an influential global role since the end of the Second World War in 1945. This 
chapter will study the tension between the rhetoric and reality in British foreign policy as they 
pertain to discussions about its role in the world, and some of the paradoxes this has thrown 
up over the decades since 1945.  
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office currently manages nearly 270 diplomatic 
posts in 170 countries, employing 14,000 staff in missions ranging from large embassies to 
smaller consulates (FCO 2011). Britain aside, France is the only other state that enjoys 
membership of all the institutions shown in Figure 2.1 (note to ed: that figure can still be 
included and is still available online, albeit through a different link). However, membership 
of a given international organisation does not necessarily guarantee inﬂuence over its outlook, 
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policies, working methods or activities on the ground. Nor do the British seem as comfortable 
working with their partners in some international organisations as they do in others. For 
example, in the aftermath of the Second World War Britain was a founder member, and 
enthusiastic advocate, of the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) but was rather more hesitant about joining what since 1993 has been the European 
Union (EU). The EU was formerly known as the European Economic Community (EEC), 
created by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (the last three 
known as the Benelux states) when they signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957; Britain joined 
the EEC in 1973. Accounting for the organisational framework within which Britain’s global 
relationships play out helps us to understand both the scope and limits of Britain’s role in the 
world. It also provides crucial insights into the debates surrounding the nature and conduct of 
British foreign policy today when the financial resources being dedicated to government work 
across the board are being dramatically squeezed following the stringent government 
spending cuts announced in the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review. 
The United Nations 
Britain was one of the founder members of the UN in October 1945 and has an Ambassador 
permanently stationed at the UN headquarters in New York, heading the UK’s Mission to the 
United Nations. Together with France, the US, Russia and China, Britain is one of ﬁve 
Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (the P5 of the UNSC), giving it an 
influential voice in helping the UN’s effort to uphold peace and security around the globe 
through diplomacy, information gathering and the deployment of military force. Ten other 
states are voted onto the Security Council for a period of two years each, making for a total of 
ﬁfteen states on the UNSC at any one time: the core or permanent members circled by ten 
non-permanent members (UN undated) (Figure 2.2 – does this document still exist? Can find 
replacement if necessary). 
[Insert M02NF2.1 near here] 
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[Insert M02NF2.2 (to include M02up2.1) near here] 
Table 2.1 Use of the veto in the P5 
Period China* France Britain US USSR 
Russia 
Total 
Total 6 18 32 82 124 261 
2008 1  –  –  –   1   2 
2007 1  –  –  –   1   2 
2006 –  –  –  2   –   2 
2005 –  –  –  –   –   – 
2004 –  –  –  2   1   3 
2003 –  –  –  2   –   2 
2002 –  –  –  2   –   2 
2001 –  –  –  2   –   2 
2000 –  –  –  –   –   0 
1999 1  –  –  –   –   1 
1998 –  –  –  –   –   0 
1997 1  –  –  2   –   3 
1996 –  –  –  –   –   0 
1986–95 –  3  8 24   2  37 
1976–85 –  9 11 34   6  60 
1966–75 2  2 10 12   7  33 
1956–65 –  2  3  –  26  31 
1946–55 (1*)  2  –  –  80  83 
* Between 1946 and 1971 the Chinese seat on the Security Council was occupied by the Republic of China (Taiwan), 
which used the veto only once, to block Mongolia’s application for membership in 1955. The first veto exercised by 
the present occupant, the People's Republic of China, was therefore not until 25 August 1972. 
 
 The P5 members have an effective veto over substantive issues that come before the 
Security Council, giving them significant leverage in core UN discussions and debates (Table 
2.1). Since the establishment of the P5 the heaviest users of the veto (Global Policy Forum 
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undated a) have been Russia (124 times) and the US (82 times). This reﬂects the geopolitical 
standoff between the Russian and American blocs that developed over nearly ﬁfty years after 
the establishment of the UN during what was known as the Cold War. Britain has used the 
veto 32 times, the last time in December 1989 along with France and the US over a resolution 
on the situation in Panama. Other resolutions vetoed by the UK in the 1980s included such 
issues as sanctions against South Africa, where Britain exercised its veto on several 
occasions, and over the Falkland Islands (Global Policy Forum undated b). We can see that 
P5 members tend to use the veto where they deem resolutions to be potentially damaging to 
their vital national interest, usually but not always deﬁned in security terms. 
The European Union 
Like many of the international organisations considered in this chapter, the origins of the EU 
lay in the determination of leading European nation-states after 1945 to avoid sliding into 
another destructive war, as had occurred twice in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. The 
wider security context was also an important stimulus and was noticeable in American policy-
making circles (see Lundestad 2000; McGuire and Smith 2008). As the Cold War between 
Russia and the US gathered momentum, Washington strategists wanted to see Europeans 
building up their national defences as a means of deterring a potential attack from the East, in 
the event that the ‘cold’ war turned ‘hot’. Attention on the western side of the Iron Curtain 
became ﬁxed on how to solve the ‘German question’ and in particular how to tie Germany 
into an institutional framework that would allow it to recover economically and politically 
without becoming once more an aggressive, expansionist power capable of destabilising the 
continental landmass of Europe as it had been under Hitler. Throughout the history of 
integration in western Europe we see economic means being used for political ends. The 
assumption of this ‘functionalist’ approach to integration (Haas 1958) is that creating 
interdependence between nation-states is a sound way of helping them see how damaging the 
selﬁsh actions of one state can be to a whole community of states; furthermore, by working 
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together and ‘pooling’ sovereignty in international institutions states can achieve collectively 
what they would not be able to achieve alone. 
 
 Various British Conservative and Labour governments decided to remain aloof from 
Europe’s integrationist experiments for over twenty-ﬁve years. Britain ﬁnally joined in 1973 
under the Conservative government of Edward Heath, following two failed applications in the 
1960s. Despite giving rhetorical support to the general idea of a ‘United Europe’, 
Westminster politicians have been cautious about involving Britain in a project they worried 
could potentially create a supranational political union. Britain was, however, a founder 
member of the intergovernmental Council of Europe, established in May 1949 with nine other 
states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden (Figure 2.3). In September 1959 the European Court of Human Rights was 
established in Strasbourg to ensure that states meet the obligations they sign up to when they 
join the Council. 
[Insert M02NF2.3 near here] 
 
 In Britain, support for the Council of Europe was cross-party and came from such 
inﬂuential ﬁgures as wartime leader Winston Churchill (The Churchill Society undated) and 
Labour’s Foreign Secretary at the time of its establishment, Ernest Bevin, who said it would 
inspire ‘something new and hopeful in European life’ (Bevin 1949). 
 
The Clement Attlee Labour government of 1945–51 decided not to take Britain into 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  
 
PROFILE: Clement Attlee 
Clement Attlee (1883-1867) was leader of the Labour Party for two decades, 1935-
55, and served as Prime Minister 1945-51, having been Deputy Prime Minister in 
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Winston Churchill’s national coalition government during the Second World War. The 
Attlee governments are best remembered for putting in place a large scale 
nationalization programme in Britain and for founding the welfare state, including 
such key and enduring institutions as the National Health Service (NHS). Attlee 
largely left foreign policy in the hands of his ebullient Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin 
(1881-1951) although he took a close interest in British moves to develop an 
independent nuclear weapon and found the post-war international security 
architecture such as NATO. Attlee and Bevin have been called ‘Cold Warriors’ every 
bit as frequently as their Conservative peers from the time (see for instance Taylor 
1990), showing the strength of the consensus about Britain’s role in the world that 
emerged and consolidated in the early years after the Second World War.   
[INSERT M02UP2.2 HERE] 
 
Formally created by the Paris Treaty of April 1951, the ECSC put control of the two 
industries vital to a nation’s war-making capacity in the hands of a European decision-making 
body, the High Authority. Its founder members were ‘the Six’ that would later found the 
EEC: France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux states. When the Conservatives were returned 
to power under Winston Churchill in 1955 there were high hopes that he would alter Labour’s 
negativity towards European integration. However, they continued the extra-European focus 
in the nation’s postwar foreign policy by keeping Britain out of the EEC. Instead, in 1960, 
Britain helped found the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) along with Austria, 
Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. The Conservative administration in 
London saw EFTA as a means of protecting the British economy from the potentially harmful 
impact of being outside the trading bloc created by the Six; to the EEC Europeans, however, 
this move looked like a hostile effort to torpedo their ambitious designs at birth. Britain 
consequently lost a lot of good will it had built up among the countries of western Europe and 
form many years remained outside the EEC club (Ellison 2000). By 1960 it was fair to say 
that Europe was at ‘sixes and sevens’: the six of the EEC against the seven of EFTA. 
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[Insert M02UF2.1 to include M02UP2.3 and M02UP2.4] 
 
 The creation of EFTA could not disguise the increasingly evident weaknesses in the 
British economy, and civil servants and politicians in London soon began to notice a marked 
divergence between the performance of the British economy and those inside the EEC. Not 
just this, Britain’s trade patterns were  shifting markedly from Commonwealth states to states 
in western Europe. During the 1960s Britain twice applied twice to join the EEC but was 
rebuffed by France’s use of the veto to block Britain’s accession (Ludlow 1997; Daddow 
2003). After the second ‘non’ the British left their application on the table and the 
Conservatives under Edward Heath were ﬁnally able to take Britain into the EEC in 1973.  
 
PROFILE: Edward Heath 
Edward Heath (1916-2005) was leader of the Conservative Party 1965-75 and Prime 
Minister during a turbulent period at home and abroad in 1970-74, particularly with 
regard to the economy and fraught industrial relations. Heath served in the Royal 
Artillery during the Second World War and this strongly moulded his belief that 
international cooperation was necessary to overcome some of the worst excesses of 
nationalism and insecurity in international affairs. He was particularly exercised about 
how to resolve the ‘German problem’ in European and global politics. Heath was a 
critic of Eurosceptics who he believed yearned for Empire and wrongly kept Britain 
out of the early steps of European integration, and his maiden speech in Parliament 
in 1950 was on the virtues of Britain joining the European Coal and Steel Community. 
Heath was proud to have been the Prime Minister who finally helped Britain into the 
EEC in 1973 and tried to manage foreign policy expectations by talking of Britain as 
‘a medium power of the first rank’ (quoted in Harvey 2011: 5).   
[INSERT M02UP2.5 HERE] 
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These troubled decades in Britain’s European policy set the tone for much of what has 
followed, with the British routinely struggling to accept the idea of a European future and 
tending to opt out of new plans for integration, notably the single European currency, the 
Euro. The huge backbench rebellion by Conservative Members of Parliament in October 2011 
over a proposal to hold a referendum on Britain’s EU membership demonstrates the continued 
ability of the Europe question to be a thorn in the side of Britain’s leading political parties 
(Taylor 2011; Watt 2011). Furthermore, the economic crisis in the Eurozone has 
reinvigorated Euroscepticism in Britain and this will continue to make ‘Europe’ a divisive and 
controversial issue in British foreign policy discussions. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
In contrast to the EU, Britain is an enthusiastic participant in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), not least because of American membership. Being active in NATO 
allows London to express its fulsome support for Britain’s bilateral relationship with the US, 
forming the axis which ‘arguably runs at the heart of the alliance’ (Beech 2011, 350). Britain 
was a founder member of NATO, set up in April 1949 to promote the goals of the Atlantic 
Charter: freedom, security and prosperity for signatory countries, built on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law (NATO 1949). The UK delegation to NATO 
is based in Brussels, headed by an Ambassador and staffed by civil servants from the Foreign 
Office, the Ministry of Defence and the three armed services: Army, Navy and Air Force. 
NATO membership was attractive to Attlee’s postwar Labour government for two principal 
reasons.  
 
 The ﬁrst and most immediate concern facing British foreign policy-makers when 
NATO was created was to safeguard the country’s security against the potential of attack by 
Germany and perhaps more urgently Russia, as the Cold War heightened East-West tensions 
in Europe in the later 1940s. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty set down the principle that 
‘an armed attack against one or more of [the signatories] in Europe or North America shall be 
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considered an attack against them all’. In this event all other NATO members would come to 
the aid of the party under attack, using armed force if necessary (NATO 1949). Following the 
terrorist attacks on US soil in September 2011 Article 5 was invoked for the first time in 
NATO history on 4 October 2011.  
 
The second reason why NATO was attractive to Britain was that it had US 
membership. With the US on board the organisation had military as well as diplomatic 
credibility and played to the instinctive Atlanticism of British Foreign Secretary Bevin and 
Prime Minister Attlee. Essentially a product of the Cold War, since the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc in 1989 NATO has spent a good deal of time deﬁning and redeﬁning its role for the 
twenty-ﬁrst century (Medcalf 2008). Since 2003 NATO has expanded both its membership 
(currently 28 countries) and its military infrastructure so that it can play a constructive part in 
what are known as ‘out-of-area’ operations in places such as the Balkans, Afghanistan, the 
Darfur region of Sudan and, more recently, the successful intervention in Libya under 
Operation Unified Protector from March to October 2011 (NATO 2011). 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an intergovernmental 
body dealing with early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict 
rehabilitation – the kinds of issues that military organisations such as NATO are ill-equipped 
to deal with. Originally founded by the Helsinki Act of 1975 at the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) it originally sought to promote dialogue between states 
of the East and states of the West. At the end of the Cold War the CSCE helped the newly 
independent states in central and eastern Europe make the transition to democracy and free 
market economies, as well as dealing with internal and external threats to their security and 
stability (OSCE, undated: 1). The OSCE has a comprehensive threefold deﬁnition of security, 
working across these dimensions to fulﬁl its missions: traditional political–military security, 
economic security and environmental and human security. The methods it uses are equally 
 11 
wide- ranging, from dialogue and security-building, election monitoring and promoting press 
freedom, through to arms control and environmental activities. You can see in Figure 2.1 that 
the OSCE is the largest of the speciﬁcally security-focused international organisations with 56 
members (as of March 2009). Crucially, it is the only organisation outside of the UN that 
brings the US and Russia to the same table. 
 
 As with the other international organisations covered here, the UK has a formal 
delegation based at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna and this represents the UK at the 
weekly meetings of the Permanent Council, works on arms control, and with the OSCE’s 
human rights institutions notably the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) ‘to promote human rights and democracy through project work, election 
observation missions and legislative advice in participating States’. The Coalition government 
has maintained New Labour’s focus on promoting human rights in a rules-based international 
system, clearly set out in the Foreign Office’s annual human rights report (for instance FCO 
2010)  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Britain has been a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) since 1961. The forerunner to the OECD was the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation, set up in 1948 to administer Marshall Aid funds from the US to help 
western European states recover from the ravages of the Second World War. The aim of the 
OECD is to help its members achieve sustainable economic growth and employment and  
more broadly to contribute to global economic stability and expansion by encouraging free 
trade practices in the developed and developing worlds (OECD undated a). The OECD also 
gathers together a huge amount of economic statistics, reports and publications that help 
London’s decision-makers shape the country’s foreign economic policy (OECD undated b). 
Circles, pivots and bridges: ideas about British foreign policy 
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Understanding how Britain’s external outlook is expressed through its membership of 
international organizations is one way of understanding Britain’s place in the world today. 
For a more complete picture, however, it is important to appreciate how this practice has been 
inﬂuenced by shifting ideas about Britain’s role in the world. In something of an ongoing 
cycle, ideas help inform the practice which impacts back upon ideas about British foreign 
policy, so disentangling the one from the other can be problematic. This section will trace the 
evolution of British foreign policy thinking by studying two periods. In the ﬁrst and by far the 
longer of the two periods we see the big ideas about Britain’s role in the world taking shape 
and entrenching themselves within the political class and public mind at large. This is the 
imperial period which lasted roughly from the end of the American War of Independence in 
1783 to the middle of the twentieth century when Britain developed and managed a sprawling 
global Empire only to see it collapse after the Second World War. The second period began 
with the election of the Tony Blair-led Labour government of 1997 which tried, perhaps more 
than any of its predecessors, to help Britain come to terms with its decline as a ‘great’ global 
power. New Labour privileged the ethical dimensions of British foreign policy, making the 
case for a combination of hard-headed pragmatism and active interventionism to protect 
British citizens and innocent civilians from harm in trouble spots around the world. 
Paradoxically, however, ideas about Empire and Britain’s status as a major global player have 
died hard in Establishment Britain and it is doubtful whether New Labour successfully 
managed to implement a truly post-imperial foreign policy for Britain. David Cameron’s 
Coalition government has, broadly, accepted the fundamentals of New Labour’s foreign 
policy thinking but badged it differently- ‘Liberal Conservatism’. 
From Empire to decolonisation 
At its height in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the one idea that dominated 
British foreign policy thinking was the importance to Britain of possessing and expanding the 
British Empire. This Empire was constructed after the United States Congress declared in 
July 1776 that the thirteen American colonies which were then at war with Britain would 
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henceforth be independent from Britain, that is, not formally part of the British Empire. 
Instead of concentrating on its transatlantic Empire, the British threw themselves into fresh 
imperialist expansion in key strategic locations such as India and the countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa, such that by the years between the First and Second World Wars the British Empire 
stretched over one-quarter of the land surface of the earth and contained one-ﬁfth of its 
population. As one scholar of Britain’s role in the world has observed:  
 
Empire for more than a century was the most important transnational space inhabited by the 
British and it had a profound impact on British politics, particularly on the way British 
people thought about race, and about the role of the British state in the world. 
(Gamble 2003: 62)  
 
It was both a formal and informal Empire. It was formal in that the British controlled the 
various colonies which made up the Empire and locked them into an informal economic 
sphere ‘dominated by British companies, and a currency sphere in which the pound sterling 
was the accepted master currency’. The British maintained their domination of global trade by 
encouraging worldwide acceptance of the principle of the liberal economic order – the free 
movement of goods, capital and people (Gamble 2003: 79–80) backed by ‘a sufﬁcient 
exertion of power [notably the Navy’s ‘gunboat diplomacy’] to secure an open market in 
which contracts would be enforceable’ (Clarke 1996: 13–14). It may seem anachronistic 
today, but politicians such as Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India 1899–1905, could contentedly 
claim in the Victorian era that the British Empire was ‘the greatest force for good the world 
has ever seen’ while academic historians such as J.R. Seeley at Cambridge could publicly talk 
of Britain’s civilising ‘destiny’ without fear of contradiction or dissent from the governing 
elites in Establishment Britain (Schama 2002: 262). 
 
 In the years 1950–4 the Empire–Commonwealth accounted for some 49 per cent of 
Britain’s imports and accepted 54 per cent of British exports (Kennedy 1985: 335); in 1956 
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45 separate governments were controlled by what was then the Colonial Ofﬁce (Cross 1968: 
325). By 1960, however, Harold Macmillan (Conservative Prime Minister 1957-63) identiﬁed 
the growing strength of what he called ‘this African national consciousness’ which became in 
the minds of London’s foreign policy makers a symbol that attitudes towards the necessity 
and desirability of Empires were changing at home and abroad. Macmillan observed that: 
‘The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this 
growth of national consciousness is a political fact . . . and our national policies must take 
account of it’ (Macmillan 1960). One year later Macmillan applied to take Britain into the 
EEC, citing structural shifts in Britain’s trading patterns from Commonwealth to Empire as a 
signiﬁcant factor in the government’s thinking about Britain’s policy towards European 
integration (Camps 1964: 231). Continuing economic crises culminating in the devaluation of 
sterling in November 1967 helped prompt a second, and again unsuccessful, application, this 
time by Harold Wilson (Labour Prime Minister 1964-70 and 1974-76). Britain was finally 
accepted into the EEC club in 1973 and this lengthy process appeared to show that the 
country’s leaders and public had come round to accepting the reduced role and status of a 
regional power, commensurate with its economic capabilities.  
 
Another demonstration can be seen in the 1964-70 Wilson government’s deep defence cuts 
which included withdrawing British forces from bases east of the Suez Canal in 1967 
(Alexander 2003). This move appeared to indicate Britain’s inability to cling to Empire as an 
outlet for its global power and prestige. Indeed in one interpretation it ‘symbolized Labour’s 
determination to leave the Empire behind’ altogether (Gamble 2003: 209). However, while 
the rapid dissolution of Empire over a period of little more than twenty years from the retreat 
from India and Burma in 1947–8 may have signalled the end of the ‘formal’ Empire, the 
values and national purposes Britain had tried to inculcate through the possession of its 
overseas territories as far aﬁeld as Canada, Africa, Asia and Australia left a deep 
psychological legacy. Echoes of Empire continue to be heard in British foreign policy 
thinking to this day (Calvocoressi 2009: 177). The ‘winds of change’ might have blown 
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through the Empire, but had they blown through the corridors of the Foreign Office and 
Downing Street in London? When considering British foreign policy it is important to ask 
whether the Wilson years were quite the turning point they sometimes seem, given the 
persistence of great power pretensions from 1945 to the present. 
Churchill’s ‘three circles’ and Britain’s ‘great’ world role 
The Second World War proved how futile it was for Britain to hold on to far ﬂung territories 
which drained vital resources from its economy at a time when national self-determination 
movements in Asia and Africa were bringing the ethics of imperial foreign policies into the 
realm of public and political debate the world over. Britain had already suffered serious 
economic upheaval with the end of the gold standard in September 1931 when the link 
between the one-to-one exchange value of the pound and gold was ﬁnally broken for good. 
For an economic system that had been in operation since the early eighteenth century and 
which had survived (just) the upheaval of the First World War, it was a sign of the economic 
turbulence of the times that the British had to admit defeat and that the pound was no longer 
deemed to be as valuable as gold. A more immediate and, in national security terms, 
potentially more devastating challenge to British power and prestige came from the rise of the 
Axis powers, Germany, Italy and Japan in the 1930s. The Second World War (1939–45) 
drained Britain economically. Historian Simon Schama estimates that ﬁghting the war cost 
Britain £7,000 million ($7 billion), or a quarter of its economy, with defence spending 
accounting for some 10 per cent of gross domestic product by 1945 (Schama 2002: 540). By 
the end of hostilities the serious problems afflicting the economy in Britain typiﬁed the 
situation across Europe where all the major players were deemed to be on the verge of 
economic, not to mention political and social, collapse (Ellwood 1996). 
 
 How would the British react to being forced into relying on a now superior economic 
power, the US, to bail it out of its economic travails and help provide for its continuing 
national security against a potentially resurgent Germany and a hostile Russia? One idea that 
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took hold came from then Opposition leader Winston Churchill, in his speech to the 
Conservative Party Conference in 1948, the theme of which was how to provide for national 
security when ‘the state of the world and the position of our country in it, have sunk to levels 
which no one could have predicted’ (Churchill 1948: 149). In a short passage midway through 
the speech, Churchill suggested that the British had a unique role to play in the world by 
virtue of being ‘the only country which has a great part to play in every one’ of ‘three great 
circles among the free nations and democracies’ (all quotations in this section are from 
Churchill 1948: 153) (Figure 2.4). 
[Insert MO2NF2.4 near here] 
 
 Churchill’s ﬁrst circle, ‘naturally’, was the British Commonwealth and Empire which 
he had earlier in the speech described as ‘the foundation of our Party’s political belief’. The 
second circle was ‘the English-speaking world in which we, Canada, and the other British 
Dominions play so important a part’. Last on Churchill’s list was ‘United Europe’ and this 
might have been symbolic, especially given the time Churchill spent in the speech discussing 
the need for close British ties with the US and his comments on the importance of Empire. 
But what gets forgotten about this speech is that prior to setting out his model Churchill had 
eulogised the principle of European integration and stressed that ‘there is absolutely no need 
to choose between a United Empire and a United Europe. Both are vitally and urgently 
necessary.’ More evident in the speech than any denigration of the European ideal was 
Churchill’s view that, of all the countries in the world, Britain was uniquely placed to play an 
active global role by virtue of its worldwide diplomatic entanglements. Its European 
connections would provide a prop to, rather than the end of, the nation’s outward-looking 
foreign policy agenda. 
 
 Churchill’s approach to understanding Britain’s role in the world has proved 
remarkably popular whichever main political party has been in power, Labour or 
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Conservative. Even as the British economy fell into a state of disrepair British leaders have 
never quite been able to give up on the idea that Britain can play out a globally important role 
for the good not only of Britain but the world itself. A few illustrations from across the post-
1945 period nicely illustrate this gap between rhetoric and reality. Churchill’s contemporaries 
such as Attlee and Bevin, overseeing the development of the atomic bomb and dealing with a 
host of imperial problems and military flashpoints around the world, did not disappoint those 
with exalted expectations of the role Britain could play globally after 1945, even as the facts 
of the matter were becoming clearer. For example, while negotiating a huge post-war US 
bailout to Britain, Foreign Secretary Bevin was adamant that the money would be used to 
prevent Britain becoming a second-class power and in fact that Britain could retain its power 
and influence with regard to the US and USSR  (Taylor 1990: 74-75). 
 
 
Returning to power after the Attlee-Bevin years, the Churchill governments of 1951-55 saw 
an opportunity to enact their global great power pretensions, even though by 1952 the Cabinet 
was openly debating the link between national poverty and foreign policy in times of 
economic downturn (Hurd 2010: 343). Churchill’s Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden actively 
espoused the three circles model in his speech to the Party conference in 1953, evidence that 
‘the rhetoric lingered on’ because it drew on an imperialist mentality ‘which he shared with 
millions’ (Hurd 2010: 346). Taking over from Churchill in April 1955, Eden (Prime Minister 
1955-57) set about resorting to traditional and rather blunt instruments of British diplomacy in 
places such as Egypt. It resulted in the Suez Crisis, when a planned invasion cahoots with 
France to reoccupy the Suez Canal following renationalization in July 1956 by Abdel 
Nasser’s Egyptian government had to be called off in November 1956 under considerable 
pressure from the US. 
 
 Suez marked the end of Anthony Eden’s political career but it did less than might 
have been expected to end Britain’s extensive rhetorical commitment to global power and 
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prestige. Harold Wilson, who as we have seen oversaw the symbolically important defence 
cutbacks from east of Suez, declared in 1964: ‘we are a world power or we are nothing 
(quoted in Taylor 1990: 133) and this sentiment was echoed through even some of the darkest 
days for the British economy, including emergency loans from the International Monetary 
Fund, in the 1970s. Margaret Thatcher (Conservative Prime Minister 1979-90) did as much as 
any post-war prime minister, however, to demonstrate the continued vitality of great power 
pretensions beneath the surface of defence cutbacks and acceptance of a more coherent role 
for Britain centring on membership of the EEC. Britain’s 1982 invasion of the Falkland 
Islands, 8,000 miles across the Atlantic, to reclaim disputed British territory that had been 
captured by the Argentinians in April of that year, led to her pronouncement in a speech at 
Cheltenham on 3 July that: ‘We have ceased to a nation in retreat’ (Thatcher 1993: 235).  
 
Even though the outcome of the conflict was a close-run thing it helped Thatcher 
launch an attack on the ‘decline’ thesis and its political and public reception showed how the 
nation still yearned for ‘the reproduction of past glories’ (Taylor 1990: 123). Enthusiastically 
embracing the Churchillian guise of war leader Thatcher used this foreign policy adventure to 
claim that ‘Great Britain is great again’ (quoted Reynolds 1991: 261) and harked back to 
history to ram this point home at Cheltenham: ‘we rejoice that Britain has rekindled that spirit 
which has fired her for generations past and which today has begun to burn as brightly as 
before’ (Thatcher 1993: 235). John Major, Margaret Thatcher’s successor as Prime Minister 
(1990-1997), continued like his predecessors to tread a fine line between recognising 
economic and political reality whilst at the same time advancing the case for a major world 
role for Britain. Reflecting in his autobiography on Britain’s membership of the UNSC the 
(then) Group of Seven (G7) industrial nations, the nation’s hugely effective armed forces, the 
‘special bonds’ of Commonwealth and our ‘close links’ with the US, Major writes that ‘our 
voice counted at the top table. I was determined to ensure that it should continue to do so’ 
(Major 1999: 495-96). As with so many prime ministers and foreign secretaries from1945 
onward, this snapshot of Major’s foreign policy outlook shows how the British political class 
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has been hooked on the idea of maintaining global pretensions seemingly against all odds. 
The tensions that have emerged from aspiring to play out a ‘great’ global role in the face of 
severe economic problems have broadly come to be captured in the Establishment consensus 
that, in the words of Douglas Hurd (Conservative Foreign Secretary 1989-95),  Britain had 
‘punched above its weight’ in world affairs since 1945 (quoted in Harvey 2011). Had the time 
come by the end of eighteen years of Conservative government in 1997 to accept this 
assessment and reduce Britain’s global great power pretensions in thinking as well as 
practice?    
Updating the three circles model: Blair’s ‘bridge’, 1997-2010 
As we move further away from the war years 1939-45 we might have expected to see a drop 
in the popularity of the Churchill analogy as Britain’s reduced resources shaped expectations 
about what was achievable externally. As Britain did less around the world this would ease 
pressure on the nation to be everywhere trying to do everything. However, we have already 
seen that leaderships on both the Labour and Conservative side were fixated by the idea of a 
great global role. What about a ‘new’ Labour leader in Tony Blair actively looking to 
refashion a ‘new’ image for Britain centred on ‘constructive engagement’ with the EU, 
reminiscent of Edward Heath’s approach – would he fare any better? Tony Blair reshaped 
Churchill’s three circles model to take account of the geostrategic context of British foreign 
policy at the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century. Blair replaced Empire with the US but made 
much the same kinds of claim as Churchill about Britain occupying ‘pivotal’ or special place 
in the world as an arbiter between Europe, the US and the wider world. Blair’s thinking on 
foreign policy came to centre on the idea that Britain could act as a ‘bridge’ between Europe 
(meaning the EU) and the US. In this vision for British foreign policy Britain would maintain 
its centrality in world affairs by being a Churchill-esque point of contact between Brussels 
and the national capitals in Berlin, Paris, Rome and so forth on the one hand, and Washington 
on the other. Blair’s thinking was plain to see in 1997, with the ‘bridge’ in place as a blunt 
fact of international life: ‘We are the bridge between the US and Europe. Let us use it. When 
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Britain and America work together on the international scene, there is little we can’t achieve’ 
(Blair 1997). 
 
 Even in speeches where Blair pushed the British to accept a European future he could 
not resist the bridge analogy: ‘we are stronger in Europe if strong with the US. Stronger 
together. Inﬂuential with both. And a bridge between the two’ (Blair 1999b). Blair’s 
unwavering public support for George W. Bush’s decision to undertake military operations to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein in March 2003 caused huge controversy within European–
American relations and Britain’s decision to support the US aroused great hostility in other 
leading EU countries such as France and Germany. Undeterred, Blair was still expounding the 
‘bridge’ idea in November 2004, albeit with slightly less conﬁdence than he had done in 
previous years:  
 
We have a unique role to play. Call it a bridge, a two-lane motorway, a pivot or call it a 
damn high wire, which is often how it feels; our job is to keep our sights ﬁrmly on both sides 
of the Atlantic. 
(Blair 2004) (Figure 2.5) 
[Insert M02UF2.2 here to include MO2UP2.6 and MO2UP2.7] 
Tony Blair’s successor Gordon Brown (Labour Prime Minister June 2007 to May 2010) had 
ably supported this approach to British identity and role in the world and, as expected, made 
little alterations to the policies and rhetoric devised by Tony Blair and his foreign secretaries. 
In appointing the strongly Blairite David Miliband as Foreign Secretary Brown signalled that 
little would alter under his stewardship. Indeed, Brown was so taken with trying to solve the 
serious economic crisis that hit economies around the world in 2008 that foreign policy took 
rather a back seat. Brown developed new priorities around such favoured ideals as aid and 
development  to the poorest regions of the world, but on the ‘big’ issues such as Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Britain’s relations with the EU and US Brown continued where Blair left off. 
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Siginificantly for our purposes in this chapter, Brown and Miliband alighted on the idea of 
Britain being at the ‘hub’ of global political and economic relations, indicating their 
Churchillian style conviction that Britain could yet enact an exceptional role in international 
politics (on Brown and Miliband see Daddow 2011: 243-53).    
A ‘force for good’: British foreign policy from Blair to 
Cameron 
In the previous section we saw how Tony Blair tried to update Churchill’s idea of the three 
circles of British foreign policy for the twenty-ﬁrst century. This went hand-in-hand with a 
whole host of other ways in which the New Labour government from May 1997 set about 
refashioning Britain for life in the fast-paced twenty-ﬁrst century. ‘New’ Labour as the 
governing party liked to be known, wanted to fashion a ‘New’ Britain which could build on 
the best aspects of the country’s past but also move beyond that in terms of a fresh 
appreciation of the nation’s role in an era of globalization and complex interdependence. 
Churchill’s ‘three circles’ were not quite forgotten but they were thought about in a new light. 
The question is: did Blair and his team succeed in forging a post-imperial foreign policy? We 
will take each plank of the New Labour foreign policy agenda in turn, and assessed how the 
government set about modernising British foreign policy by devising new ways of 
conceptualising and speaking about Britain’s role in the world. We will suggest that the 
Conservative-Liberal Coalition government formed in June 2010 signed up to much, but 
perhaps not all, of what New Labour had in mind for British foreign policy. 
[Insert M02NF2.5 near here] 
Ethics and foreign policy 
Just ten days into New Labour’s governance of Britain, on 12 May 1997, Foreign Secretary 
Robin Cook launched a New Mission Statement for the Foreign Office, part of New Labour’s 
wider approach to government which it wanted to be ‘businesslike’. The New Mission 
Statement went hand-in-hand with a Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Published in July 1998 
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the SDR sought to align British military capabilities and defence posture more closely with its 
foreign policy objectives (McInnes 1998), and was built on the characteristic New Labour 
promise of ‘radical change and solid planning’ (Robertson 1998: 4). The SDR was updated in 
2002 to account for the impact of the events of ‘9/11’ on the global security environment (Cm 
5566 Vol. I, 2002). The New Mission Statement set down four goals for British foreign 
policy, what Cook called his ‘contract with the British people on foreign policy’ (Cook 1997). 
The ﬁrst goal of British foreign policy should be to safeguard national security, particularly 
but not exclusively through NATO membership. Cook’s second goal was economic- to boost 
British prosperity by promoting UK business abroad and encouraging exports (the Coalition 
government has gone even further in this regard). The third goal was to protect the 
environment and improve the quality of life in Britain. The fourth goal was the most 
commented upon: ‘to secure the respect of other nations for Britain’s contribution to keeping 
the peace of the world and promoting democracy around the world . . . Our foreign policy 
must have an ethical dimension . . .’ with human rights at its centre (Cook 1997). This latter 
goal went to the very heart of what New Labour felt ‘modern’ Britain should be about. It 
believed the country should command respect from other states in the international arena not 
because of its superior coercive power (the tenets of an imperial foreign policy backed by 
‘gunboat diplomacy’) but because Britain stands out as a beacon, a ‘force for good in the 
world’ (Cook 1997). 
Doctrine of the international community 
In truth, Cook’s idea of the ‘ethical dimension’ never really took off in a serious or sustained 
way, not least because Prime Minister Blair hesitated to give it enthusiastic backing over a 
prolonged period of time. Meanwhile, issues such as arms sales to countries with dubious 
human rights records soon took the gloss off Cook’s high blown rhetoric and rather 
overshadowed developments that elsewhere had much positive impact (see for example 
Guardian 2001). Over New Labour’s first term in office (1997-2001) the ‘ethical dimension’ 
was quietly dropped, yet New Labour remained rhetorically committed to the liberal idea that 
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Britain should act as a ‘force for good’ in the world. Blair’s regular commitment of UK armed 
forces to military interventions for humanitarian purposes, for example in Kosovo in 1999 
and Sierra Leone in 2000, stand out as hard examples of the expeditionary impulse in British 
foreign policy under New Labour (Daddow 2009). These operations were seen by Blair as 
instances of the ‘international community’ in operation. As he saw it, in an era of increased 
interdependence between states British national interests could be negatively affected by the 
actions of evil leaders, rogue states or destabilising intra-state conflicts in apparently remote 
parts of the globe. For example, drugs cultivated from poppies in Afghanistan could appear 
on Britain’s streets because of the speed of modern day travel and the problems of policing 
porous national borders; terrorists were gaining ever easier access to the raw materials to 
make devastating weapons such as ‘dirty bombs’. Blair believed collective action can and 
should be undertaken to sort out humanitarian crises and the problems of crime and 
international terrorism at source, if such action was judged likely to succeed. He went on to 
set out the ‘circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s 
conﬂicts’: Are we sure of our case? Have all diplomatic options been exhausted? Can military 
operations be ‘sensibly and prudently undertaken’? Are we in it for the long term? And are 
there national interests involved? (Blair 1999a).  
While controversial in some quarters, the ‘Blair doctrine’ garnered much support ‘as 
the best way of defending our interests and the moral way of promoting our values’ (Powell 
2007). For instance, the Foreign Office’s 2008 Mission Statement, ‘Better World, Better 
Britain’ updated and refined Labour’s internationalist approach which continued to shape 
New Labour’s foreign policy thinking under Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Foreign 
Secretary David Miliband from June 2007 to June 2010. Indeed, at the launch of Labour’s 
2008 National Security Strategy (NSS), Gordon Brown followed in Blair’s footsteps by 
making the case for an ‘all risks’ approach to understanding and protecting national security 
because ‘no country is in the old sense far away when the consequences of regional instability 
and international terrorism … reverberate quickly around the globe’ (cited in McCormack 
2011: 118). 
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 [Insert MO2UP2.8 near here] 
 
 A Liberal Conservative Foreign Policy 
Before coming to power in 2010 Prime Minister David Cameron and Foreign Secretary 
William Hague were adamant that in government they would pursue what they called a 
Liberal Conservative foreign policy; ‘Liberal, because Britain must be open and engaged with 
the world, supporting human rights and championing the cause of democracy and the rule of 
law at every opportunity. But Conservative, because our policy must be hard-headed and 
practical, dealing with the world as it is and not as we wish it were’ (Conservative Party 2010: 
109). Sceptical of what the Conservative Party election manifesto wrote off as ‘grand utopian 
schemes’ for remaking the world, Cameron and Hague sought to differentiate their approach 
from New Labour’s and in the process also challenged significant elements of previous 
Conservative Party thinking (Beech 2011: 358). However, they could not escape the new 
interventionist ‘paradigm’ that had taken a hold of British foreign policy. The reason, said 
Hague, was the pragmatic realisation that the world had moved on and the Conservative Party 
had to move with the times: ‘In Britain, [Tony Blair’s] “Liberal interventionism’ has 
generated much debate but to varying degrees all of us have subscribed to it’ (Hague 2009). 
The major foreign policy crisis that the 2010 government initially had to deal with – Libya –
proved him correct and entrenched the interventionist ideal still closer to the heart of British 
foreign policy thinking.  
Thus, it seems fair to suggest that continuity rather than change has most been in 
evidence in the conduct of the Coalition government’s foreign policy since 2010, which we 
can see in three main ways. First, the Coalition government has accepted New Labour’s 
interpretation that globalisation hugely affects the UK national security by bringing problems 
from apparently remote parts of the world to Britain’s door. Multilateralism continues to play 
a central part in British foreign policy thinking. William Hague in particular has trumpeted 
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the challenges facing foreign policy in a ‘networked world’ (Hague 2010) and sought to 
engage with new social media such as Twitter in a bid to reach parts of the national and 
international communities other Foreign Secretaries could not reach. For example, on 9 June 
2011 Hague conducted a ‘Twitter chat’ on Libya. Insecurity as a product of porous national 
borders and the growing scale of transntional threats is what the government’s Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) has sought to address (see below). 
Second, the Coalition government has embraced the engaged New Labour 
interventionist posture and justified a ‘war of choice’ in Libya accordingly as being of benefit 
to the British national interest. Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy’s handling of the Libyan crisis 
was a good example of prominent European nations taking a lead in co-ordinating 
international efforts to combat human rights abuses, especially on Europe’s doorstep where 
the Americans are less keen to tread. At the same time, a point of difference between 
Cameron and Blair, argues academic observer Justin Morris, is that Cameron is likely to be 
more cautious than Blair about intervening in the affairs of another state for acts that fall short 
of genocide and the Coalition’s ‘propensity to resort to force will be markedly less than that 
exhibited by the governments of Tony Blair’ (Morris 2011: 341). After Iraq, the British 
public’s appetite for interventions without clear and obvious purpose appears to be limited at 
best and this has served to limit any Blair-style adventures (into Iran for example) on the part 
of David Cameron. 
Third, as outlined in the government’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(SDSR), the Coalition government remains committed to pursuing a nostalgically-inclined 
‘great’ role for Britain, echoing leaders back to Churchill and since, as we have seen in this 
chapter. Its opening line reads: ‘Our country has always had global responsibilities and global 
ambitions’ (HM Government 2010a: foreword). Even in times of stringent financial austerity 
the idea that Britain might retrench from its global outlook is anathema to Whitehall decision-
makers. As a Times commentator noted of Hague’s hugely ambitious July 2009 speech on 
doing everything from revivifying the Commonwealth to engaging more deeply with the 
emerging ‘BRIC’ economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China), ‘Britain faces the question of 
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whether, after Iraq, financial crisis and recession, it chooses to be a shrunken power. Hague’s 
answer is no’ (cited in Daddow 2011a). Following the Eurozone crisis, even the idea that 
Britain might take on the role of a regional power (wholeheartedly inside the EU) with global 
interests is a discussion the government seems unwilling to have, referendum or no 
referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU. 
To knock the square peg of an enhanced global outlook into the round hole of 
financial crisis the government has sought to do what it feels it needs to protect its national 
interest on the world stage more strategically, reforming its working methods and increasing 
cross-department collaboration, particularly with regard to the role of the Department for 
International Development. Here we find echoes of the 1998 SDR’s call for defence and 
foreign policy to be conducted jointly, more ‘smartly’ and in a more ‘business-like’ fashion. 
Early warning about the likely eruption of security threats, the government believes, will 
necessitate less frequent and costly action to rectify the consequences of such instability 
spreading disorder around the globe. Meanwhile, William Hague has committed himself to 
strengthening ‘the long-term capability and international effectiveness of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office as an institution as the heart of government’ (Hague 2011). After what 
he sees as the organisation’s untimely decline during the Blair years, Hague’s effort to put a 
gloss on the role of the FCO will face the same budgetary challenges as his government’s 
wider attempt to carve out a leading role for Britain in the world. 
  
Chapter summary 
This chapter begins by exploring the history and legacy of Britain’s key international 
relationships, focusing on its involvement in key international organisations: the UN, EU, 
NATO, the OSCE and OECD. It moves on to explore the key ideas that have shaped 
contemporary British foreign policy thinking, centring on Winston Churchill’s alluring ‘three 
circles’ model of Britain’s place in the world and New Labour’s updating of that line of 
thought through its concept of Britain acting out the role of a ‘bridge’ on the world stage. The 
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final part surveys the transition from Labour to the Coalition government, particularly the 
continued emphasis on interventionism within British foreign policy discourse under the new 
guise of a Liberal Conservative foreign policy.    
Discussion points 
 Do you think Britain still warrants its place as a Permanent Member of the UN Security 
Council? 
 How much global inﬂuence does Britain gain from its membership of (a) NATO and (b) 
the OSCE? 
 Did the 2011 parliamentary debate on the referendum on Britain’s EU membership 
demonstrate that Britain is still Europe’s ‘awkward partner’? 
 What are the principal ideas that have helped shape British foreign policy since 1945? 
Are these ideas relevant today? 
 Did the 2003 invasion of Iraq show that Britain still places too much emphasis on its 
‘special relationship’ with the United States? 
 Explain how Britain has tried to act as a ‘force for good’ in the world since 1997. Has it 
succeeded? 
 How does a Liberal Conservative foreign policy posture differ from an ‘ethical’ foreign 
policy? 
 What impact has ‘globalisation’ had on the definition of the British ‘national interest’ 
over the past two decades? 
Further reading 
Coverage of the general themes, issues and controversies in British foreign policy considered 
in this chapter can be found in Jamie Gaskarth (2013), John Dickie (2007), David Sanders 
(1990), Robert Holland (1991) and Paul Kennedy (1985), with a useful focus on the impact of 
decolonisation on Britain’s image of itself as a Great Power in Heinlein (2002). On the 
strategic, political and economic dimensions of the British Empire see P.J. Cain and A.G. 
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Hopkins (1993) and Eric Hobsbawm (1990); on the notion of the ‘two’ British Empires see 
Marshall (2001) and Bayly (2001). Ferguson (2004) gives a good overview of Britain’s wider 
imperial experiences. On the ‘special relationship’ and the myths that surround it see John 
Charmley (1995) and David Dimbleby and David Reynolds (1988), and especially John 
Baylis (1997) on the slipperiness of the concept. Britain’s troubled attempts to come to terms 
with the idea of European unity are documented in John Young (2000) and Hugo Young 
(1998), while Daddow (2011b) traces New Labour’s troubled attempts to reach a new 
consensus on the matter. Stephen George’s famous thesis (1998) is that Britain has been 
Europe’s ‘awkward partner’ – even after joining the organisation. 
Good surveys of New Labour’s foreign policy include Richard Little and Mark 
Wickham-Jones (2001), Mark Curtis (2003), Paul Williams (2005) and Daddow and Gaskarth 
(2011). Rhiannon Vickers shows the party political roots of this foreign policy trajectory 
within the Labour Party (2011), while Anne Deighton (2005) shows the strong links between 
Blairite and Churchillian thinking on British foreign policy. On the ‘ethical’ foreign policy 
see Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne (1998) and for critiques of this agenda see Christopher 
Hill (2001) and especially David Chandler (2003). William Wallace (2005) critiques Blair’s 
endeavour to situate Britain as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and America. Reflections on the 
SDR can be found in Cornish and Dorman (2009). 
The foreign policy of the 2010 Coalition government is well covered in Dodds and 
Elden (2008), Beech (2011) and Morris (2011). The SDSR receives critical treatment in 
Dover and Phythian (2011), while the negative implications of Britain’s gradual 
disengagement from the Europe’s common effort at defence co-operation is charted in 
O’Donnell (2011). David Cameron explained the principles of Liberal Conservatism in 
foreign policy (Cameron 2006) as did William Hague before coming to office (Hague 2009). 
 
 On the causes and conduct of the American Revolution see Wood (2003). The 
history, structure and functions of the UN are detailed in Baehr and Gordenker (2005) and 
Thomas Weiss (2008) considers how to improve the UN machine. NATO’s post-Cold War 
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identity crisis is well covered in Moore (2007), Smith (2006), Sloan (2010) and Webber and 
Hyde-Price (2011). For an alternative approach to the OSCE’s role in promoting security see 
Sandole (2007). 
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